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RUSSIA TODAY, CYBERTERRORISTS 
TOMORROW: U.S. F AlLURE TO PREP ARE 
DEMOCRACY FOR CYBERSPACE 
Jonathan F. Lancelot 
Norwich University 
ABSTRACT 
This paper is designed to expose vulnerabilities within the US electoral system, the use of 
cyberspace to exploit weaknesses within the information assurance strategies of the democratic 
and republican party organizations, and deficiencies within the social media communications and 
voting machine exploits. A brief history of discriminatory practices in voting rights and voting 
access will be set as the foundation for the argument that the system is vulnerable in the cyber 
age, and the need for reform at the local, state and national levels will be emphasized. The 
possibility of a foreign nation-state influencing the outcome of an election by using cyber warfare 
tactics should give us pause as this opens the US democracy to terrorist organizations who have 
the means to disrupt a US election via cyber-attack. 
Governments keep their promises only when they are forced, or when it is to their advantage to do 
so. -Napoleon Bonaparte 
l. THE ROOTS OF A 
VULNERABLE 
DEMOCRACY 
If we want to get to the root of the problem of 
US elections being influenced by forces other 
than the winds of democracy and the will of 
the American people, we must look to the 
history of disenfranchisement and the exclusion 
of specific groups of Americans from voting or 
having a stronger voice within the public 
dialog. For example, "throughout the history of 
our country, those in power have devised a 
multitude of devices to diminish voting power. 
These include gerrymandered voting districts, 
all-white primary elections, literacy tests, poll 
taxes, arcane voter registration procedures, and 
annexation of white suburban neighborhoods 
by cities about to achieve a black voting 
majority" (The JBHE Foundation, Inc, page. 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
61). This is a reality of US history that still 
haunts the US electoral system since the 
passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 
There are remnants of the government's past 
in disenfranchisement that continue to eat at 
the social fabric and the democracy itself. "The 
personal cost of voting is a potentially 
important part of the decision calculus as well. 
Recent voter-ID laws potentially increase this 
cost in at least two ways. First, voters who fail 
to supply the necessary identification may be 
turned away without voting. Second, there are 
sometimes monetary and preparation costs 
associated with voter-ID laws that voters must 
incur. These costs may be relatively low or 
high depending on a voter's level of 
sophistication, work flexibility , or income" 
(Mycoff, Wagner, Wilson, page. 121). Third, 
the sunsetting of important clauses within the 
Voting Rights Act has allowed states to return 
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to behavior that excluded certain voters and 
continue to create room for fraud and new 
vulnerabilities before we even explore the cyber 
element of US elections. "Representative John 
Lewis- an icon of the civil-rights struggle-
highlighted remaining challenges to equitable 
voting and called for continued work on rights" 
(Graham, page. 4), and the fact that the 
problem of rights is still an issue the US 
government is struggling to demonstrate the 
potential for an electoral disaster that will be 
even worse than a rival nation-state interfering 
in US elections. 
The US Electoral System struggles with 
corruption within the dealings of politicians ( of 
both major political parties), lobbyists and 
donors. For instance, criminal behavior around 
voting machines has placed doubt on the 
integrity of election results. "Rep. Vernon 
Ehlers (R-Mich.) lays most of the blame for 
current electronic voting machine failures with 
former Rep. Bob Ney (R-Ohio) , who preceded 
Ehlers as House Administration chairman who 
was sentenced in connection to his association 
with disgraced lobbyist Jack Abramoff' 
(Murray, page. 2). It also does not help to 
secure a democratic system when unlimited 
monetary funds can be dumped into a 
candidate's campaign to give them an unfair 
advantage or can be dumped into an election 
cycle to influence the results on election day. 
"In Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme 
Court again addressed a First Amendment 
challenge to the ban on corporate 
electioneering activities. After two rounds of 
brief and oral arguments, a narrow majority of 
the Court overturned Austin v. Michigan State 
Chamber of Commerce and portions of 
McConnell v. FEC and struck down the 
portions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act of 2002 that prohibited expenditures on 
electioneering communications by corporations" 
(The Harvard Law Review Association, page. 
76). The roots of vulnerability within the US 
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election system are broad, and election 
interference (in the democratic process) is not 
a new problem. What is new is the ability of 
rival nation-states and terrorist organizations 
to utilize cybercrime, cyber espionage, and 
cyber warfare to disrupt the democratic 
process, endangering the citizenry. 
2.DEEPROOT 
ANALYTICS: GIVING 
AWAY THE SHOP 
Information gathering on voter attitudes and 
preferences is nothing new m American 
politics. Democratic and Republican parties are 
both patrons of companies like Deep Root 
Analytics that give them an edge in predicting 
voter behavior and tethering their strategies to 
such information. Unfortunately, "the firm left 
198 million voter records unsecured online for 
nearly two weeks. This should give every 
American pause, particularly at a time when 
intelligence officials say the Russian 
government actively seeks to undermine 
American elections" (Lapawsky, page. 2). The 
data theft was significant, and the amount of 
data stolen is staggering. "This particular 
breach, discovered by researcher Chris Vickery, 
exposed 1.1 terabytes of personal information 
compiled by Deep Roots Analytics, a company 
that analyzes not just basic data like names 
and addresses, but also scores how particular 
voters feel about a range of political issues, 
from gun control to offshoring in the auto 
industry. Vickery's discovery illustrates how 
poorly organizations safeguard sensitive 
information" (Lapawsky, page. 2). As every 
aspect of a person and organizations life is in 
cyberspace, democratic institutions are no 
different. Secure US elections as they are 
structured today provides no security and 
integrity to the vote and provide no 
cybersecurity or 
Questionable data 
have to be from 
information assurance. 
collection does not always 
a breach; the controversy 
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between Facebook and Cambridge Analytica is 
an instance where a social media company 
seemed to hand over customer data over a 
private data collecting organization, which 
made efficient use of the information towards a 
political end. "Cambridge Analytica, a political 
data firm fired by President Trump's 2016 
election campaign, gained access to private 
information on more than 50 million Facebook 
users. The firm offered tools that could identify 
the personalities of American voters and 
influence their behavior" (Granville, New York 
Times). In this case, Face book was allegedly 
complicit in the scheme. How much the 
company at the highest levels knew, and when 
they knew it does not even matter at this 
point, Facebook is 
devastating criticism 
internationally for their 
currently receiving 
from governments 
lack of oversight in 
customer privacy. In the United Kingdom 
(UK) , "the Digital, Culture, Media, and Sports 
(DCMS) Select Committee's far-reaching 
interim report on its 18-month investigation 
into fake news and the use of data and 'dark 
ads' in elections offer a wide-ranging, informed 
and sustained critique that with it the full 
weight of parliament. The verdict is withering: 
Facebook failed" (Cadwalladr, The Guardian). 
The failure is rooted in the social media 
company's recalcitrance in mitigating the 
unauthorized release of customer data, 
deliberate or not. In concurrence, the fact that 
a political campaign hired Cambridge 
Analytica leads to the issue of domestic abuses 
of elections which is an issue embedded within 
the history of US political culture. 
The fact that US politicians have 
influenced elections domestically using illegal 
methods is well known. However, the 
implications of US politicians influencing 
elections with the aid of a foreign nation-state 
or foreign entity is disastrous . "Suspicion has 
mounted about whether the Trump campaign 
somehow colluded with Russian actors to 
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influence American voters" (Lapawsky, page. 
2). This matter is still under investigation. The 
2016 election was rife with elements of 
cybercrime, and the case of the DNC hacking 
incident is most intriguing, as the cybercrime 
of hacking into DNC servers exposed domestic 
instances of anti-democratic practices within 
the Democratic primary. "The Kremlin has 
denied Russian involvement in the DNC 
breach. But the reverberations continued; 
DNC Chairwoman Debbie Wasserman Schultz 
resigned after emails revealed what many views 
as the unfair treatment of Bernie Sanders" 
(Glaser, Page. 4). The damage to the DNC 
organization was devastating, and the events 
of 2016 revealed that cyberwarfare is a reality 
as there is no guarantee the US government 
will be able to react to the next attempt on an 
election in the future . The democratic and 
republican organizations in the US Congress 
have shown no signs of coming together to 
solve the issue of cybersecurity and democracy 
and continue the behavior of hyper-
partisanship which is a continuation of 
widening the fissures that makes future cyber-
attacks on our elections more likely. "All is it 
amounts to a political system that needs to 
devote at least as much energy into securing 
its systems as it does into securing votes. At 
this point, there is no saying they weren't 
warned" (Lapawsky, page. 6), and it seems 
today the warnings has caused some panicking 
within the beltway. 
3 . CAN TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATIONS 
THW"ARTTHE 
DEMOCRATIC 
PROCESS? 
In cyberspace, a non-state organization can do 
as much damage as an 
nation-state, and it 
anonymously. Therefore, 
organization or a 
could be done 
it is logical to 
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conclude that if Russia can allegedly do it, so 
can a sophisticated terror organization. For 
instance, "on February 16th , 2018 Special 
Counsel Robert S. Mueller III indicted 13 
Russian individuals and three Russian 
organizations for engaging in operations to 
interfere with US political and electoral 
processes, including the 2016 presidential 
election. This was a significant step forward in 
exposing a surreptitious social media campaign 
and holding account those responsible for this 
attack" (US House of Representatives). The 
importance of looking at this issue beyond 
nation-state borders, as nation-states can 
either accept or deny responsibility is critical. 
In this case, the Russian government denies 
responsibility. "Russian Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov came away from the meeting saying 
Trump had heard out Putin's assurances that 
Moscow did not run a hacking and 
disinformation effort and had dismissed the 
entire US investigation into Russian role" 
(Filipov, Paletta, Phillip). Diplomatically, if we 
consider the Russian government was not 
involved with the hacking of the 2016 election, 
we should have pressed them to conduct their 
own investigation and give us their conclusion 
so both nation-states can narrow it down. If 
they refused, only then we would know 
conclusively if the Russian government was 
involved. Did the 13 Russian individuals and 
the three Russian organizations act as 
individuals? It is a reasonable question 
knowing the nature of the worldwide network 
' 
and the capability of acting anonymously or 
with a false identity. "Most hacking is 
motivated by nefarious and fraudulent aims." 
(Hampson, page. 516). In fact, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigations (FBI) has calculated 
the financial cost to victims of cybercrimes 
outside the realm of political campaigns. In 
2017, "the Internet Crime Complaint Center 
(IC3) says victims' losses exceeded 1.4 Billion 
in 2017. Top ten crimes types reported to IC3 
(by victim loss) are: 
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Real Estate/ Rentals, $56,231 ,333 
Investment, $96,844,144 
Advance Fee, $57,861,324 
Corporate Data Breach, $60,942,306 
Confidence Fraud/ Romance, $211,382,989 
Identity Theft, $66, 815,298 
Non-Payment / Non-Delivery, 
$141,110,441 
Personal Data Breach, $77,134,865 
Credit Card Fraud, $57,207,248 
Business E-Mail Compromise/ E-Mail 
Account Compromise, $676,151,185" 
(FBI.gov). 
So, we can conclude that well-funded 
terrorist and criminal organizations are capable 
of hacking elections, as long as they are 
supported by a nation-state 's resources and a 
strategic objective, for example organizing a 
massive DDoS attack on multiple candidate 
websites, or hack voter databases. Dan 
Wallach, a computer science professor at Rice 
University, notes that the internet is a 'messy 
place' with a lot of background traffic, and it 
would be difficult to find its origin because 
attackers are very good at hiding their 
location" (Sainz, page. 3). Therefore, the 
question is how do we verify a cyber-attack 
from a nation-state if government leaders deny 
responsibility? Most of all, how do we prevent 
democratic systems from being hijacked by 
rivals and terrorists? 
4. POSSIBLE SOLUTION: 
E-GOVERNANCE 
Lawmakers should consider legislation to 
protect the integrity of election results, election 
information, and democracy itself. "Officials 
bear a responsibility to our people and our 
Republic to embrace the best possible options, 
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and there are already opportunities to start. 
After election authorities learn of the 
advantages and scalability of blockchain 
voting, there is no excuse why they would 
continue to opt for only paper or only legacy 
electronic machines" (Spanos, page. 2) unless 
they benefit somehow from the dysfunction 
and vulnerabilities within the system. 
Blockchain technology is one possibility of 
protecting voting and election results, yet there 
are noted issues and concerns with the 
innovation. "Blockchain at its core is a peer-to-
peer distributed ledger that is 
cryptographically secure, append-only, 
immutable ( extremely difficult to change) , and 
updateable only via consensus or agreement 
among peers" (Bashir, page. 16). Conversely, 
there are ways this innovative system can be 
hacked as well. First, "a Sybil Attack is an 
attack in which the same party owns a large 
number of nodes on a single network and 
attempt to disrupt network activity through 
flooding the network with bad transactions or 
manipulating the relaying of valid 
transactions" (Risberg). Second, "a routing 
attack is an attack made possible by the 
compromise or cooperation of an Internet 
Service Provider (ISP)" (Risberg). Third, "a 
Direct Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is an 
attempt by bad actors to cripple a server, 
anything from a website to a Bitcoin node, by 
flooding it with high volumes of traffic" 
(Risberg). Lastly, "The 51 percent or majority 
attack, since the security of a blockchain is 
directly linked to the computer power building 
the chain, there is the threat of an attacker 
gaining control over a majority of the hash 
power on the network" (Risberg). Blockchain 
technology is not a silver bullet and has 
vulnerabilities, yet some benefits need to be 
examined. For example, "Blockchain-secure 
voting machines work by allowing the voter to 
scan their own paper ballot, at which point the 
vote is simultaneously and immutably entered 
into the blockchain tally. A code is generated 
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for the voter and observers, who are able to re-
input the code to verify that the vote-with 
chain-of-custody proving the time and 
location- are forever entered into the result. 
This means that for the first time, elections are 
fully transparent and publicly auditable, down 
to each and every vote" (Spanos, page. 2). The 
US electoral system is federated and 
decentralized. Blockchain allows for a 
distributed software structure that would 
mirror the different features of each state's 
electoral rules, increase the transparency and 
verify the integrity of every vote. "Centralized 
and distributed systems are architectural 
antipodes . Technical antipodes have always 
inspired engineers to create hybrid systems 
that inherit the strength of the parents" 
(Drescher, page.15). A blockchain voting 
system is a possible solution, or a partial 
solution to election fraud on most levels 
because of what the technology sets out to 
achieve. "The core problem to be solved by the 
blockchain is achieving and maintaining 
integrity in a purely distributed peer-to-peer 
system that consists of an unknown number of 
peers with unknown reliability and 
trustworthiness. This problem is not a new 
one" (Drescher, page.31). An example of a 
nation-state implementing blockchain is 
Estonia, "Its government is virtual, borderless, 
blockchained, and secure" (Heller). The 
country learned the hard way when their 
critical telecommunications infrastructure 
experienced a cyber-attack in 2007. Today, 
technology is linked throughout the society, 
and data is not collected in a centralized 
location and is protected by encryption at each 
node. "E-Estonia is the most ambitious project 
in technological statecraft today, for it includes 
all members of the government, and alters 
citizens' daily lives. The normal services that 
government is involved with-legislation, 
voting, education, justice, healthcare, banking, 
taxes, policing, and so on- have been digitally 
linked across one platform, wiring up the 
Page 27
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nation" (Heller). In Estonia, it's called e-
governance. 
The structure of this system is arranged 
where citizens can vote anywhere securely. 
"Internet voting, or i-Voting, is a system that 
allows voters to cast their ballots from any 
internet-connected computer anywhere in the 
world. Completely unrelated to the electronic 
voting systems used elsewhere, which involved 
costly and problematic machinery" ( e-estonia). 
Cybernetica, the company that developed i-
Voting states "the i-voting system consists of 
Vote Forwarding Server, Vote Storing Server, 
and Counter Server. They are responsible for 
respectively collecting, storing and tabulating 
i-votes. Counting Server is offline at all times 
due to high-security requirements" 
(Cybernetica). The next level of the system is 
"during a designated pre-voting period, the 
voter logs onto the system using an ID-card or 
Mobile-ID, and casts a ballot. The voter's 
identity is removed from the ballot before it 
reaches the National Electoral Commission for 
counting, thereby ensuring anonymity" ( e-
estonia). The downside of block chain voting 
and remote voting is addressed as "with any 
method of remote voting, including traditional 
postal ballots, the possibility of votes being 
forced or bought is a concern. Estonia's 
solution was to allow voters to log on and vote 
as many times as they want during the pre-
voting period. Since each vote cancels the last 
' 
a voter always has the option of changing his 
or her vote later" (e-estonia). This is a possible 
solution for our current electoral system, 
voting, and governance. Innovation is key to 
maintaining a stable democracy for the 2ist 
century, and tech companies like Cybernetica, 
Nortal with verification services, and 
OpenNodem, Ericsson, Telia, State 
Infocommunication Foundation, and Dell EMC 
for cloud services helped Estonia develop the e-
governance system. This is a model for the US 
to aspire to and develop a system that is not 
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as open to exploit as it is today. Currently, the 
US dealing with companies in charge of 
holding sensitive voter data for political 
campaigns getting hacked and using 
technologies that have easily breached 
vulnerabilities. For instance, "A political 
robocalling company called RoboCent exposed 
4,500 client files to the open internet by failing 
to properly configure its cloud storage on 
Amazon Web Services" (Nordrum). This is a 
devastating development that not only exposed 
voter behavior to anyone willing to seek it out; 
it endangers the very fiber of trust that is the 
foundation of any true democracy. To solve 
the issue of vulnerabilities that are created by 
voter suppression, misinformation from 
traditional and social media organizations, 
political campaign hacking, legislatively 
crippling partisanship, unlimited campaign 
donations to candidates, and political parties' 
officials rigging primary elections to the 
advantage of their favored candidates, it must 
be established that political cultures which 
encourage vice and corruption is 
counterintuitive to what a powerful 
cybersecurity strategy can offer. "What is 
often overlooked is the central role anti-
corruption, and human factors have to play in 
countering this new technological menace" 
(Black). The unifying and open nature of the 
internet has also exposed and magnified the 
deep flaws in the democratic process. It is a 
contradiction for elected officials to state they 
want to prevent interference, yet the constant 
specter of corruption and illegal machination 
remains as we continue into new election 
cycles. "The leaders of four US intelligence 
agencies reaffirmed at the White House on 
Thursday that 'pervasive' and 'ongoing' 
threats from foreign actors, including Russia, 
to interfere m upcoming US elections" 
(Breuninger). Fortunately, "on January 6th, 
2017, the Secretary of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) designated election 
systems as critical infrastructure, created as a 
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subsector under the existing government 
security sector" (Homeland Security), yet this 
is not enough to protect our democracy and 
our national security. We need a unified 
government to agree on issues that address the 
vulnerabilities in our cyber-defense capabilities. 
Currently, there is no consensus on how to 
approach intermestic cyber policy and law 
enforcement issues. Nevertheless, the state of 
Utah used Cybernetica's i-Vote technology 
"during 2016 Republican presidential caucus on 
the 22nd of March; voters had the opportunity 
to vote using the traditional methods or vote 
online" ( Cybernetica) . Consequently, there is 
no reason or excuse for the US government not 
to protect and defend the democratic 
institution enshrined by the Founders, and 
that is synonymous with protecting and 
defending the US Constitution. Today, waiting 
for the 9-11 of cyber-attack to react to a zero-
day event takes us from a dangerous situation 
to a potentially crippling one. There needs to 
be a national conversation on the deep issues 
that divide and brings the people together, a 
conversation that will lead us to an upgraded 
method of governing our democracy. However, 
we are facing rivals that can shut down our 
elections with the push of a button, and time 
is running out. 
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